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THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PASSIVE 
MINORITY EQUITY INTERESTS: REPLY 
DANIEL P. O'BRIEN 
STEVEN C. SALOP* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article published in thisjournal,Jon Dubrow examines the 
acquisitions of passive minority equity interests. l The focus of his article 
is the treatment of these transactions by the courts and the federal 
antitrust agencies, including their treatment of the investment-only 
exemption from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. One section of the article 
discusses the economic foundation for the competitive effects analysis 
of these acquisitions, focusing mainly on our article recently published 
in this journal.2 Dubrow accepts the basic economic framework set out 
in our earlier article, and the analysis of factors that affect the acquiring 
firm's control or influence over the target. 
However, Dubrow is highly critical of our treatment of the financial 
interest of the acquiring firm and particularly the partial ownership 
scenario that we refer to as "silent financial interest." He argues that our 
* Daniel O'Brien is Deputy Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade 
Commission. Steven Salop is Professor of Economics and Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center and Senior Consultant to Charles River Associates. We would like to thank 
Debra Holt, Henry Huser, Serge Moresi, and John Woodbury for helpful conversations 
on these issues. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport 
to represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner. 
1 Jon B. Dubrow, Challenging the Economic Incentives Analysis of Competitive Effects in Acquisi-
tions of Passive Minority Equity Interests, 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 113 (2001). 
2 Daniel P. O'Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Oumcrship: Financial 
Interest and Corpurate Control, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 559 (2000). See also RobertJ. Reynolds & 
Bruce R. Snapp, The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures, 4 INT'L 
J. INDUS. ORG. 141 (June 1986); Timothy F. Bresnahan & Stephen C. Salop, QJ.tantifYing 
the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 155 (June 1986); 
David A. Malueg, Collusive Behavior and Partial Ownership of Rivals, EAG 90-9 (U.S. 
Dep't of Justice Econ. Analysis Group Discussion Paper 1990); Joseph Farrell & Carl 
Shapiro, Asset Oumcrship and Market Structure in Oligopoly, 21 RAND J. ECON. 275, 287 (1990); 
A.E. Rodriguez, Some Antitrust Concerns of Partial Equity Acquisitions 15 (Bureau of 
Econ. FTC Working Paper No. 186, 1991);John E. Kwoka,Jr., The Output and Projit Effects 
of HorizontalJoint Ventures, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 325-38 (Sept. 1992); Ian Gale, Price Competition 
in Non CovperativeJoint Ventures, 12 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG., Mar. 1994, at 53. 
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financial interest analysis ignores several important "real-world" compli-
cating factors that significantly reduce or even eliminate the economic 
incentives of the acquiring firm to reduce its competitive intensity follow-
ing the acquisition of a passive minority financial interest. In this reply, 
we respond to Dubrow's criticisms and present our view of how such 
complicating factors should be reckoned into the analysis. 
II. OUR FRAMEWORK AND QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Our article starts from the premise that a partial ownership interest 
involves two distinct elements-financial interest and control/influence 
rights. The acquiring firm's financial interest entitles that firm to a share 
of the profits and value of the target firm. That financial interest affects 
the competitive incentives and decisions of the acquiring firm. The 
acquiring firm also may obtain the ability to influence or even control the 
target. These control/influence rights allow it to affect the competitive 
incentives and decisions of the acquired firm. 
A partial ownership transaction that gives the acquiring firm a particu-
lar financial interest share may be accompanied by more or less control/ 
influence rights. For example, a 49 percent financial interest gives consid-
erable influence and control if the next-largest shareholder has a 5 
percent interest, but much less (if any) control if another shareholder 
has a 51 percent interest. In addition, in modern corporate finance with 
multiple classes of stock and complex voting rules, the voting share 
does not necessarily equal the share of financial interest. Indeed, a 
shareholder could have substantial financial interest share but be rele-
gated to a passive ownership position, with virtually no control/influence 
beyond what is given by corporate and securities laws.3 Antitrust consent 
decrees also could reduce or eliminate the shareholder's influence.4 
The residual rights provided by corporate and securities laws raise the 
question of whether most real-world partial ownership interests are or 
ever could be purely passive as a practical matter, absent a formal side-
agreement or consent decree.5 Absent a side-agreement, minority share-
3 Even these "default" rights may be altered by private contracts in some cases. 
4 For example, in the case of TCl's financial interest in Time Warner, an FTC consent 
decree eliminated TCl's ability to influence Time Warner's competitive decisions. See 
Time Warner, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3709 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1997). 
5 For example, in the Northwest/Continental matter, Northwest placed its stock into 
a 6-year (and then a 10-year) voting trust in an attempt to satisfY Department of Justice 
concerns about its control over Continental. However, DOJ concluded that Northwest 
would retain important residual rights that would give it significant influence over Conti-
nental. See United States of America v. Northwest Airlines Corp., http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/cases. 
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holders sometimes have the right to bring stockholder mismanagement 
suits against the management of the target, suits that can be used to 
exert some influence over the target firm.6 
If the minority shareholding is small, it might be thought that the 
incentive to bring such mismanagement suits would be small. This is 
because the plaintiff bears the full cost of the suit but only gets a fraction 
of the benefits. However, when the shareholder is a competitor, there 
is a powerful force in the other direction. If the acquiring firm can sue 
or threaten to sue to influence the target to compete less intensely, then 
a lower financial interest share means that the reduction in the target's 
profits is borne mainly by the other shareholders, while the acquiring 
firm gets the benefit of less intense competition. We discuss this latter 
"free rider" issue in detail in our "Total Control" scenario.7 For this 
reason, the pure passivity inherent in our "silent financial interest" sce-
nario may best be viewed as a limiting case, absent credible evidence 
regarding the inability or disincentive to bring mismanagement suits. 
Our economic analysis of the incentive effects of passive minority 
financial interest follows the standard economic analysis of unilateral 
incentive effects.s If a firm acquires a purely passive financial interest in 
a competitor, with absolutely no control or influence, it will recognize 
that the target's incentives will remain the same as before the acquisition. 
However, in making its own competitive decisions about its price, output, 
and investment, it will take into account the impact of the financial 
interest on its own incentives. Instead of trying to maximize solely its 
own profits, it will try to maximize the sum of its own profits, plus the 
investment income earned from its financial interest in the target. That 
investment income equals, in the simplest case, the profits of the target 
times the acquired firm's financial interest share of the target. Formally, 
this can be written as 
(1) 
6 A current example is LVMH's ongoing mismanagement lawsuit before the Dutch 
courts attacking Cucci's 1999 decision to form a strategic alliance with PPR. Cucci alleges 
that this strategic alliance has enabled it to pursue a more aggressive competitive strategy 
against LVMH and its other competitors. See LVMH Commences Legal Action Against 
Cucci Poison Pill Mechanism, LVMH Press Release, http://www.lvrnh.com (Feb. 25, 1999); 
L VMH Legal Action Against Cucci and PPR and Warns Against Implementation of Strategic 
InvestmentAgreement, LVMH Press Release, http://www.lvrnh.com (june 9,1999); LVMH 
Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA and others v. Cucci Croup NY and others, Enterprise 
Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Case No. 167/990K 
7 O'Brien & Salop, supra note 2, at 578. 
B In economic language, "unilateral effects" refer to competitive effects that arise 
through the adjustment from one (non-collusive) equilibrium to another following a 
merger or partial acquisition. 
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where W represents the wealth of the acquiring firm, ITA represents the 
profits of the acquiring firm, ITT represents the profits of the target, and 
B represents the acquiring firm's financial interest share in the target. 
When the acquiring firm takes its investment income into account, its 
competitive incentives will change. For example, in making its own pric-
ing decision, it will recognize that an increase in its own price will 
lead some of its customers to substitute to purchasing from the target, 
increasing the sales and profits of the target. As a shareholder in the 
target, the acquiring firm is able to share in the resulting increased 
profits and/or capital gains on its stock ownership. This fact leads the 
acquiring firm to have an incentive to pull its competitive punches, 
relative to its incentives absent the acquisition. The magnitude of this 
effect on its incentives depends on the magnitude of the financial interest 
and the impact of this substitution on the profitability of the target firm. 
A complete competitive effects analysis of a partial ownership acquisition 
also would involve evaluation of easy of entry, efficiency benefits, and 
other competitive effects factors. 
Our earlier article explains how to quantify this incentive effect, based 
on the type of data generally collected in the course of a Hart-Scott-
Rodino premerger review. We explain how the basic HHI methodology 
can be applied and a modified HHI (MHHI) can be derived that takes 
the partial ownership interest into account. In the case of a passive (or 
"silent") financial interest, the MHHI "delta" equals the financial interest 
share (B) times the product of the firms' market shares. This may be 
compared to a full merger, where the MHHI "delta" equals twice the 
product of the firms' market shares. 
To illustrate using Dubrow's numerical example, suppose that GM 
buys a 45 percent silent financial interest in Ford. Suppose that minivans 
constitute a relevant market and GM's and Ford's market shares are 20 
percent each. In that case, a merger between GM and Ford would increase 
the HHI by 800 points (i.e., 2 x 20 x 20). In contrast, GM's acquisition 
of the 45 percent passive financial interest would increase the MHHI by 
only 180 points (i.e., 45 percent x 20 x 20). 
Our article also derives a second methodology, the Price Pressure 
Index (PPI). This methodology also relates to the analytic foundation 
of the Merger Guidelines's section on unilateral effects in differentiated 
products markets. In contrast to the MHHI, which is a market-wide index, 
there is a separate PPI for each of the merging firms. The PPIs depend 
on diversion ratios and margins earned by the firms, as well as the 
financial interest share. 
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We also briefly discuss how merger-specific efficiencies generated by 
the transaction can be incorporated into the PPI methodology, and how 
the PPI can be combined with a merger simulation model to derive what 
might be termed an Equilibrium Price Index (EPI) for each firm in the 
market.9 The EPIs take into account all the feedback among market 
participants from the partial ownership interest and the merger-
specific efficiencies. 
III. THE CRITICISMS OF OUR FINANCIAL 
INTEREST ANALYSIS 
Dubrow is highly critical of our financial interest analysis. He argues 
that we "presume a formulaic level of financial interest and economic 
incentives" that is "divorced from real-world factors." These complicating 
factors "could render the possibility of competitive harm unlikely." These 
complicating factors involve: (1) incomplete information by the manag-
ers of the acquiring firm, (2) the personal financial incentives of the 
managers of the acquiring firm, and (3) the inability of the acquiring 
firm to capture the benefits of its investment. According to Dubrow, 
these factors imply that one cannot simply presume that the acquiring 
firm will have the incentive to raise price. Instead, one must examine 
these "myriad factors ... before one can presume that the investment 
in a competitor would, in fact, provide any meaningful incentive to 
increase prices or change other competitive behavior."10 
These criticisms suggest that these real-world complicating factors 
significantly dampen or altogether eliminate the incentives of the acquir-
ing firm to pull its competitive punches. Dubrow is particularly concerned 
about the situation where the financial interest is passive. This view in 
turn would imply that the agencies and courts should be much more 
permissive with respect to acquisitions of passive minority financial inter-
ests than would be implied by our quantitative methodology. 
We disagree. In addition, as we will discuss below in more detail, a 
broad reading of these criticisms might been taken as essentially rejecting 
economic incentives analysis across the board. We doubt that Dubrow 
intends this broad interpretation. However, given the scope of these 
9 There has been considerable work on oligopoly simulations of the price effects of 
mergers. For example, see Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products 
Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 363-86 
(1997); and Luke Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, Simulation the Effects of Mergers Among 
Noncooperative Oligopolists, in COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE: MODELING AND 
ANALYSIS WITH MATHEMATICA (Hal Varian ed., 1996). 
10 For the quotations in this paragraph, see Dubrow, supra note 1, at 131-32. 
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criticisms, we think that it is important to explain the flaws in this 
interpretation. 
We also disagree with most of Dubrow's specific criticisms. We do not 
think that they identify issues that can usefully differentiate a case from 
the paradigm we set out. However, we are sympathetic to a variant of 
one of Dubrow's specific concerns, the one relating to the ability of the 
acquiring firm to capture the benefits of its investment. We agree that 
the inability to capture benefits can be a dampening influence in certain 
circumstances, though our analysis differs substantially from the specific 
scenario discussed by Dubrow. Dubrow focuses on market risk. We think 
that such a problem instead could arise from the acquiring firm's lack 
of control over the target's management, along with a lack of confidence 
in their investment possibilities or skills. The dampening effect is more 
likely when the financial interest is inherited or obtained for noncompeti-
tive reasons, rather than when it is actively acquired. 
In our view, this complicating factor at most may somewhat dampen the 
incentives of the managers of the acquiring firm to pull its competitive 
punches. However, it would not eliminate the incentives of the acquiring 
firm to soften its competitive decisions. We also disagree with the thrust 
and the scope of the other criticisms set out in Dubrow's article. Thus, 
we con tinue to conclude that the acquisition of passive minority financial 
interests can raise significant competitive concerns and that our analysis 
provides a valid framework for quantifying the.extent of these concerns. 
A. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
Dubrow says that the most prevalent complicating real-world factor is 
incomplete information. In his view, and in contrast to models that 
assume executives have a "near omniscient view of the competitive 
dynamics," managers in the real world lack sufficient information "to 
modify with any degree of precision their own behavior based upon the 
effect that such a change is likely to have on the profitability of the rival 
in which they have invested."ll The lack of information might involve 
an "overall lack of data" or an "unanticipated action" by another firm.12 
As a result of this incomplete information, the managers are unlikely to 
change their competitive decisions in response to obtaining a passive 
financial interest in a competitor. 
Before getting to the application of these claims to the analysis of 
partial ownership interests, it is worth noting at the outset that these 
II [d. at 133. 
12 [d. 
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incomplete information criticisms could be read as striking to the heart 
of the economic analysis used in antitrust and industrial organization 
more generally. Corporate managers clearly face incomplete informa-
tion. Incomplete information is ubiquitous in the economy. It is also 
true that incomplete information affects the incentives and decisions of 
risk-averse individuals and firms. 
Standard industrial organization economics clearly does not assume 
away this incomplete information. Instead, industrial organization eco-
nomics is premised on the view that managers are able to operate actively 
and successfully ir; an environment characterized by incomplete informa-
tion. The managers are assumed to gather information and make deci-
sions efficiently to maximize expected profits, despite imperfect and 
costly information. 13 A rejection of the ability of managers to take into 
account and make decisions in response to a significant change in the 
corporation's investment portfolio thus represents an extreme (and, we 
think, unsupportable) view of imperfect information. 
Accepting this sort of incomplete information criticism whole hog 
obviously would lead to a dramatic impact on the role of economics in 
antitrust. A reader might interpret Dubrow as saying that incomplete 
information essentially paralyzes managers to the point of leading them 
to forgo profitable investment opportunities and profitable conduct. 
This would be a severe managerial overreaction, of course. After all, 
the MBAs who manage modern corporations are trained to deal with 
incomplete information in their competitive decisions. For example, in 
setting price, managers must estimate the impact of the price increase 
on the firm's sales and profits. In carrying out this analysis, the impact 
of the price increase on rivals' pricing also is relevant and must be 
reckoned into the analysis. This analysis and these decisions involve 
incomplete information. 
This point may be illustrated with Dubrow's example of General 
Motors purchasing a partial ownership interest in Ford. Suppose that 
IS See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (1997); JEAN TIROLE, 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988) (especially the chapter on the theory 
of the firm). Scherer and Ross summarize the rationale for assuming profit maximization 
as follows: "It appears that the profit maximization assumption at least provides a good first 
approximation in describing business behavior. Deviations, both intended and inadvertent, 
undoubtedly exist in abundance, but they are kept within more or less narrow bounds by 
competitive forces, the self-interest of stock-owning managers, and the threat of managerial 
displacement by important outside stockholders and takeovers." F.M. Scherer & David 
Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 52 (3d ed. 1990). 
For a recent review of the role of decision theory in business and judicial decision making, 
see C. Frederick Becker, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 
ANTITRUST LJ. 41 (1999). 
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GM raises its minivan price, expecting a fraction of the lost sales to be 
captured by Ford. According to Dubrow, that expectation might be 
disappointed if Daimler/Chrysler runs a simultaneous price promotion 
and captures all the diverted sales instead. Fearing this, Dubrow suggests 
that GM may forgo the price increase. 
It surely is true that certain expectations could deter the GM price 
increase. However, a full analysis by GM's managers would take into 
account the likelihood of this promotional conduct by Daimler/Chrysler 
and whether or not GM's initial price increase would cause such a 
promotion. In particulaI,', if the price promotion were expected to take 
place whether or not GM raises its price, then GM would have already 
accounted for its likely sales losses from that promotion in its planning, 
independent of the proposed price increase. In evaluating the profitabil-
ity of its price increase, GM would want to estimate the incremental effect 
of its price increase on sales, not the gross loss that combines the price 
increase and a simultaneous (but independent) promotion. If GM estab-
lishes that the price increase will not cause the Daimler promotion, then 
the GM post-acquisition price increase would be less likely to be deterred. 
In addition, GM obviously also would factor into its analysis other 
possible responses by Daimler/Chrysler, not just this one. In particular, 
industrial organization economics would suggest that if GM raised its 
price, there is also the possibility that Daimler/Chrysler might be more 
likely to raise its prices in response. Indeed, most economists would treat 
a price-increase response as far more likely than the opposite factual 
scenario assumed by Dubrow. Standard economic models of oligopoly 
with differentiated products have the property that a price increase by 
one firm tends to lead its rivals to increase their prices in response. 
Given this starting point, our PPI and MHHI estimates actually are 
conservative, in that they assume that competitors like Daimler/Chrysler 
do not raise their prices in response to the GM price increase. 14 Thus, 
taking this factor into account might well raise the level of competi-
tive concern. 
All in all, incomplete information is a fact of life for corporations and 
they deal with it in sophisticated ways. It would not eliminate.the incentive 
to increase price or reduce output created by a passive minority finan-
cial interest. 
14 These induced price increases and other feedbacks would be taken into account in 
full equilibrium simulation models that derive EPis. 
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B. MANAGEMENT'S PERSONAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
Dubrow's second real-world complicating factor involves the personal 
financial incentives of managers. Dubrow observes that we assume a 
"common firm-wide incentive" that he believes is "likely not present in 
many industrial structures. "15 In Dubrow's view, corporate managers are 
compensated on the basis of the performance of the business they oper-
ate, not the overall profitability of the entire corporation. Thus, managers 
would not have the personal financial incentive to sacrifice the profits 
of their particular business by raising price, even if it increases the 
investment income of the firm by even more. Indeed, according to 
Dubrow, even the senior corporate managers and the board of directors 
would not be willing to sacrifice earnings in order to boost investment 
income by more. 16 This "agency" problem thus would mean that a silent 
financial interest would not lead the acquiring firm to raise its price or 
reduce its output or investment. 
We recognize the general potential for agency costs. However, our 
framework properly assumes away this specific agency problem in the 
analysis of silent financial interest. We have two key reasons for this 
assumption. 
First, antitrust generally assumes that corporate and securities laws, 
along with the market for corporate control, ensure that the senior 
managers and board of directors act generally in the interests of share-
holders to maximize profits (i.e., the market valuation of the corpora-
tion). Thus, we assume that board and senior management take actions 
to incentivize lower-level managers to maximize corporate profits. This 
may involve monitoring their behavior directly. It also may involve the 
design of compensation structure. It is true that managers are compen-
sated on the basis of the performance of their individual businesses. 
However, they also are compensated on the basis of corporate profits. 
Modern corporations increasingly use stock options to incentivize manag-
ers to act in the interests of the entire corporation. For example, we are 
confident that the corporate managers at GM make sure that Chevrolet 
and Pontiac prices are set in the interest of GM shareholders. To take 
a more extreme case, we do not think that the Chevrolet manager 
who engages in a comparative advertising campaign that points out the 
superiority of value-priced Chevrolets versus overpriced Cadillacs would 
be rewarded. Thus, we are comfortable with our general approach of 
15 Dubrow, supra note 1, at 133. 
16Id. at 133-34. 
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assuming away a broad critique based on the personal financial incentives 
of managers. 
Second, the implications of this broad agency cost criticism go far 
beyond the analysis of partial ownership interests. We are confident that 
Dubrow is taking a narrow view of the implications of agency costs. 
However, readers might not. And, we think, a broad reading would lead 
to absurd results. For example, if one were to assume that managers 
were interested only in the profits of their specific business and totally 
ignored the implications for the corporation, then a merger among GM, 
Ford, Toyota, and Daimler/Chrysler would be permissible because it 
could be assumed that all the models would be priced independently 
by managers with a narrow focus. It similarly could not be presumed 
that merger plans were designed on average to increase efficiencyY 
Managerial aggrandizement would be the more likely presumption. IS 
Indeed, in the extreme, it might no longer be presumed that horizontal 
price fixing increases prices to unreasonable levels. Instead, lazy manag-
ers simply may be trying to save the effort of setting prices independently. 
Or, perhaps the managers are engaged in an elaborate, altruistic potlatch 
ritual to benefit their customers by setting beneficial low prices. 
Thus, although we accept the potential for certain agency problems 
in modern corporations, we are not prepared to say that managers are 
so narrowly focused and outside the control of the corporation itself to 
deter the type of anticompetitive conduct analyzed in our article. 
C. INABILITY TO CAPTURE BENEFITS 
Dubrow's third real-world complicating factor involves the inability of 
the acquiring firm to capture the benefits earned by the target firm from 
I7 This presumption is apparent in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. For example: "the 
Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers that 
are either competitively beneficial or neutral." U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade 
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 13,104. "A merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate 
its exercise unless it significantly increases concentration and results in a concentrated 
market, properly defined and measured. Mergers that either do not significantly increase 
concentration or do not result in a concentrated market ordinarily require no further 
analysis." [d. § l.0. 
18 Conversely, it could no longer be presumed that a horizontal merger between large 
firms in a highly concentrated industry would raise competitive concerns if the combined 
operation maintained separate business units run by different managers. The argument 
would be that the agency problem is so severe that it would not be possible for the owners 
to design incentive contracts that induce managers to maximize the profits of the firm. 
Of course, this is tantamount to rejecting a role for antitrust in analyzing the effects of 
horizontal mergers. 
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conduct by the acquiring firm to pull its competitive punches. 19 Although 
we disagree with Dubrow's formulation of the specific situations in which 
this inability likely affects incentives, we do agree that this problem can 
affect incentives in a different scenario. In the next section, we discuss 
our formulation and resolution of this problem. 
Dubrow raises this problem in the context of the market risk inherent 
in a partial financial interest arrangement. For example, in the case of 
multi-product firms, if the competitive overlap involves only a small 
fraction of the target's entire business, Dubrow cautions that any benefits 
from the financial interest may be swamped by the effects of other 
businesses on the overall profitability of the target firm. The return on 
the acquiring firm's investment also is affected by the aggregate stock 
market risk. 
Dubrow observes that we assume that the acquiring firm shares in the 
profits of the target firm. Yet, for public companies that do not payout 
earnings in the form of dividends, there is no direct and immediate 
profit sharing. Instead, the acquiring firm would obtain a capital gain 
based on the increased value of the acquired firm, a capital gain that 
can only be realized in the future when the financial in terest is liquidated. 
At that time, the capital gain may have disappeared from a variety of 
other shocks to the company or the economy. Thus, a company would 
not sacrifice its profits for a potential capital gain in the other company. 
We think that this criticism is highly overstated. As a general matter, 
whether the return to the acquiring firm is in the form of dividends or 
capital gains flowing from retained earnings, both increase the value of 
the acquired firm. Indeed, retained earnings and capital gains are tax 
advantaged, so that they should lead to a larger increase in the valuation 
of the acquiring firm. In fact, if the acquiring firm does not payout its 
profits either, then a price increase would increase the value of the 
investment in the target firm while decreasing the stand-alone value of 
the division of the acquiring firm. Thus, there is market risk either way. 
The shareholders would care about the overall value of their investment, 
which would incorporate (and aggregate) both effects. 
Nor would some sort of "swamping" or stock market risk issues destroy 
the incentives of the acquiring firm to take actions that increase the 
profitability of the target. It is true that the target firm's profits are 
subject to variation because of other businesses or market risk. However, 
if the acquiring firm pulls its competitive punches, the statistical expecta-
tion of the target's profits will improve. This higher expectation in turn 
19 Dubrow, supra note 1, at 134-36. 
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will be reflected in a higher expected stock market valuation or higher 
dividends on average. 
Variance in the target's profitability does reduce its stock market valua-
tion, ceteris paribus. However, this reduction is independent of the acquir-
ing firm's financial interest. This reduction occurs in the absence of the 
financial interest and before the acquisition is made. As a result, that 
stock market risk already would be reflected in a lower purchase price 
for the acquired financial interest. The market risk thus will not provide 
a general deterrent to the acquiring firm raising its price, contrary to 
Dubrow's assumption. 
IV. LACK OF CONTROL OVER THE TARGET'S 
PROFITS AND INVESTMENTS 
We disagree with the specifics of Dubrow's formulation of why the 
acquiring firm would be unable to recapture the benefits achieved by 
the target. However, we agree that a benefits-recapture problem may 
arise in certain other circumstances. This does not involve market risk 
at all. Instead, it arises because an acquiring firm with a purely passive 
financial interest by definition cannot control or influence the way in 
which the target uses the extra profits generated by the actions of the 
acquiring firm. 
When the acquiring firm raises its price after acqumng a passive 
financial interest, it trades its own profits for presumably larger returns 
earned from its investment in the target. However, this trade also involves 
reducing the profits that it controls for profits controlled by the senior 
managers of the target. This raises the risk that the managers of the 
target may not direct these earnings to their highest value uses, whether 
that involves paying them out as dividends or investing them in high 
rate of return businesses. In particular, the senior management of the 
acquiring firm may feel that they are more skillful investors, who would 
earn a higher rate of return than would the managers of the target. The 
acquiring firm may have high return investment prospects that they 
cannot afford to fund or they may feel that the managers of the target 
have a defective investment or business plan.2o To state this in the 
extreme, they may fear that the target's incremental profits will be squan-
dered in corporate jets and excessive salaries. 
20 In this regard, modern finance theory recognizes that even weJl functioning capital 
markets face moral hazard and adverse selection problems that limit the ability of firms 
to borrow. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393-410 (1981). 
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Under these circumstances, the acquiring firm may be willing to sacri-
fice some nominal earnings in order to maintain greater control over a 
higher fraction of those earnings. Thus, the acquiring firm would be 
reluctant to soften its competitive conduct to benefit the target, unless 
the increased investment income is large enough to overcome the risk 
from loss of control. This can be a valid business concern in a partial 
ownership transaction, in particular, when the financial interest is not 
actively acquired. 
In fact, a variant of this issue arose in the Time Warner acquisition of 
Turner Broadcasting.21 As part of that merger transaction, Time Warner 
acquired TCl's 23 percent ownership interest in Turner. In exchange, 
Time Warner gave TCI a small financial interest (approximately 7-9 
percent, depending on the base used) in Time Warner. This exchange 
of shares was not actively acquired by TCI. Instead, TCI only accepted 
the exchange because that plan made the transaction tax-free. 
Whereas TCI had significant influence in Turner, including board 
representation, its financial interest in Time Warner was to be totally 
passive in order to satisfy the potential objections of the Federal Trade 
Commission. Under these circumstances, the TCI senior managers indi-
cated that they would not have an incentive to sacrifice TCI profits to 
increase the profits of Time Warner. Whereas the TCI senior manage-
ment could control the disposition of the TCI profits, they would have 
no influence over the use of the Time Warner profits. Because Time 
Warner had a poor investment record at the time relative to TCI, the 
claim that TCI could not easily capture the benefits of its investment 
had some credibility. In addition, this was not a situation in which TCI 
initiated a partial ownership acquisition of Time Warner. Instead, they 
received the financial interest when Turner was sold to Time Warner. 
These considerations can be easily reckoned into our analysis. If the 
managers of the acquiring firm are more skillful investors than the target, 
then the acquiring firm would only be willing to raise its price if its 
nominal share of the increased profits earned by the target significantly 
exceed the profits that it sacrifices. Stated in terms of the profitability 
formula above, the acquiring firm would "discount" the increased profits 
earned by the target by a "discount rate" to reflect its inability to control 
the disposition of these profits. Formally, the acquired firm's perceived 
wealth could be rewritten as follows, 
21 Stanley M. Besen et aI., Vertical and Horizontal Oumcrship in Cable TV: Time-Wamer-
Turner, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 452-75 (John Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White 
eds., 3d ed. 1999). 
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(2) 
where () represents the minority passive ownership discount rate. 
Applying this discount rate does not eliminate the incentives of the 
acquiring firm to raise its price in order to increase the profits of the 
acquired firm. However, it does dampen its incentives to some degree. 
As indicated by the equation, the "discount rate" would have the same 
effect as a comparable reduction in the acquiring firm's financial interest. 
This raises the question of the specific discount rate to apply in calculat-
ing the MHHI or PPIs. The appropriate discount rate should reflect the 
reduction in value from not having control or influence over the earn-
ings. A rough estimate of the appropriate discount rate could be obtained 
from market data on the magnitude of the control premium in equity 
acquisitions. These estimates of the price premium of voting over non-
voting stock in public companies fall in the 4-7 percent range, though 
this figure does not control for the magnitude of the financial interest. 22 
Minority ownership discounts for tax purposes permitted by the Internal 
Revenue Service are another possible data source, although these dis-
counts do not necessarily reflect equilibrium rates determined in any 
real market.23 The appropriate discount rate is not a settled issue. 
To illustrate the impact of this discount rate on the MHHI calculations, 
return to the minivan example set out earlier. In that case, GM's acquisi-
tion of a 45 percent passive interest led to an increase of 180 points in 
the MHHI. Suppose that a 20 percent discount rate were applied to 
account for the fact that GM could not influence Ford's disposition of 
the higher profits and the fact that Ford had a poor investment record. 
In that case, the MHHI delta now would be 144 points (i.e., 80 percent 
x 180). With that discount rate, the transaction would still raise concerns 
under the market concentration standards set out in the Merger 
Guidelines.24 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although we disagree with most of Dubrow's criticisms of the impact 
of incomplete information on incentives, we do accept an effect based 
22 See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Cmpvrate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence, J. FIN. ECON. 12. 13, table 3 (Apr. 1983). Of course, the proper premium (or 
discount for non-control) would depend on the size of the financial interest and the 
magnitude of influence and control the shareholder otherwise would have. 
2S The IRS discounts apparently often fall in the 20-40% range. See Lynn Asinof, Family 
Limited Partnerships Can Be Dysfunctional, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1996, at Cl. 
24 Of course, analysis of concentration and market shares is only one step in the Merger 
Guidelines analytic process. A full analysis also would involve analysis of entry and reposi-
tioning, competitive effects factors, and efficiencies. 
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on a different rationale for the possible inability to capture benefits. If 
the acquiring firm is unable to control the target's use of its profits and 
potentially recapture its fair share of the higher profits it creates, the 
acquiring firm's incentives to sacrifice its profits in order to increase the 
profits of the target may be dampened somewhat. Where the seriousness 
of this problem can be demonstrated with credible evidence, the MHHIs 
and PPIs can be adjusted downward accordingly. 
However, it is important to recognize that this factor does not eliminate 
the acquiring firm's incentives to pull its competitive punches, but only 
dampens them to some extent. This analysis would not justify an exemp-
tion from Section 7 or a dramatic increase in antitrust permissiveness 
towards passive minority financial interests.25 Finally, of course, this factor 
is greatly weakened or eliminated altogether when the acquiring firm 
also has control dr influence over the target. 
This raises the question of when and how the acquiring firm can 
credibly demonstrate that this inability to capture benefits is significant. 
In this regard, evidence that the acquiring firm can exert no influence 
over the target clearly would be relevant. Evidence that the target has a 
poor investment record also would be relevant. It also would be relevant 
if the financial interest were not acquired directly and actively, but rather 
were inherited or obtained passively, say as part of a larger transaction. 
If the investment were actively obtained, there is less reason to think 
that the acquired firm so fears the loss of its investment that it would 
forgo otherwise profitable actions to benefit the target. To the contrary, 
this real-world factor would provide credible evidence that the acquiring 
firm had enough trust in the management of the target to seek out and 
acquire the original investment. 
25 In this regard, the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines recently issued by DO] and 
FfC recognize that passive financial interests can raise competitive concerns. See Federal 
Trade Commission and U.S. Department of]ustice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations 
Among Competitors § 3.34(c) (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ 
ftcdojguidelines. pdf. 
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